constitutional status. Following recent years' efforts by the Putin administration, six small regions located entirely within another region have been merged with that larger region, resulting in 83 members of the Federation at present. (On the politics of the mergers, see Busygina 2007, 63-67) . Thirty two of the original 89 regions are designated by the name of a non-Russian ethnic group or nationality comprising a relatively large portion of the region's populace followed by one of three statuses: republic, autonomous oblast' and autonomous okrug. (For brevity, we will refer to these regions as "ethnic" regions.) With the mergers of smaller regions, all of which were autonomous okrugs nested within larger regions, 26 of Russia's 83 regions are ethnic regions.
In 2000, as part of his efforts to restore the federal center's strength vis-à-vis the regions, President Putin established seven federal administrative districts, each comprising from six to 18 contiguously located regions (on these reforms, see Hyde 2001, 725-27; Nelson and Kuzes 2003; Petrov and Slider 2003; Ross 2004) . For purposes of discussion and presentation of results below, these districts are Glebova 2004; Myagkov et al. 2005; Oversloot and Verheul 2006) . The essence of the term is when one of the parties on the ballot represents (or is perceived to represent) the federal executive. A cumbersome translation that captures this meaning more fully is "the party of the powers-that-be."
1 The extent of executive-branch involvement with the party of power varied over the period. So, too, did whether the party leadership was based in the Kremlin (symbolizing the offices of the presidency) or in the White House (symbolizing the prime minister and the agencies comprising the government). Despite this variation, the appellation party of power has held meaning for both voters and elites during electoral periods. (Appendix 1 discusses the parties that were considered the parties of power in the different elections.) For the presidential elections, we are interested in the voting for either the candidate who already holds the country's executive office (true of both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin) or his designee (true of Dmitrii Medvedev). We will sometimes refer to the "in-power presidential candidate" to mean Yeltsin or Putin or Medvedev. Percentage of Vote (6.0) (7.2) (12.5) (9.1) (13.1) (9.9) (11.5) (9.1) (11.1) (8. One thing that stands out visually in Figure 1 is the difference, until 2007 and 2008 , between the levels of support received by a presidential candidate and by a party in the legislative races. In the 1991 presidential elections, the spread (standard deviation) of pro-Yeltsin voting among the regions is wider than in any subsequent presidential race. Also different from any subsequent presidential race is the size of the lower tail and the three low outliers (the Altai Republic, Aga Buryat AO and Tyva, all of which are ethnic regions). All three subsequent presidential elections are more notable for their high outliers. Only in the 2000 race is there even a single low outlier, Kemerovo oblast', explained by the fact that Kemerovo's governor, Aman Tuleev, was himself running for president.
In both 1993 and 1995, other parties outperform the party of power or proto-party of power--Russia's Choice and Our Home is Russia, respectively. What makes the latter parties' regional distributions interesting is the presence of high outliers, notably the 48% of Chechen residents reported as voting for Our Home in 1995. Two of the three high outliers for Russia's Choice in 1993 are Moscow (35%) and St. Petersburg (27%) , suggesting that the results reflect those populaces' ideological preferences to a large extent. Both regions (or, more accurately, cities of federal status) are urban with disproportionately high numbers of voters with high education and income levels. In 1995, however, the regions with high voting for Our Home cannot be explained in this way. For one thing, Our Home presented itself as representing pragmatism rather than an ideological position. For another, the regions that gave Our Home the top eight highest percentages are all ethnic regions, which are more rural and less highly educated than non-ethnic regions. Indeed, 16 of the highest 19 regional totals for Our Home come from ethnic regions. In 1993, the situation is more nearly the reverse: only eight of the top 19 regions in voting for Russia's Choice are ethnic regions, and all nine lowest regions are ethnic regions. In 1993, the t-test of the difference in means between republics/autonomous regions and other regions is +1.41 (.162).
In 1995, the t-test is -4.15 (.000).
Both the average regional vote for Yeltsin in the 1996 second-round balloting and the standard deviation of the distribution are quite similar to those in 1991. standard deviations above the mean!) Seven of these ten are ethnic regions. The median regional vote for OVR is 7.6%, substantially below its nationwide total. The voting for Unity is much higher on average and it has more regions below the mean than above (the median is slightly above the mean). The outlier at the low end is Ingushetia, the strongest pro-OVR region. The one high outlier is Tyva with 70% for Unity, lower than Ingushetia's vote for OVR but an impressive 4.9 standard deviations above the mean.
Although Putin's victory in the 2000 presidential race was relatively easy, he failed to achieve a majority in over one-third of the regions (33/89=37%). Most of those regions (26/33=79%) are non- Also interesting is that, to a significant extent, the regions giving Putin the highest totals in 2004 are the ones that gave Yeltsin high totals in the 1996 second round, albeit the meaning of a "high total" in the two elections is quite different. The two are correlated at .52 (.000).
By 2007, the number of parties on the ballot is still moderately high at 11, yet United Russia gains almost two-thirds of all votes cast, with the second-place Communist Party receiving under 12%. What is striking about the regional distribution is how many regions far outstrip UR's--quite high--overall average, including six that reported more than 90% of their voters having selected United Russia: the ethnic regions of Tyva, Karachaevo-Sirkassia, Mordova, Kabardino-Balkaria, Ingushetia and Chechnya. Four of 2 Russian electoral legislation covering the elections from 1991-2004 provided citizens with the option of participating in the voting process yet expressing dissatisfaction with all the candidates or parties by selecting "against all." On against-all voting, see Akhremenko and Meleshkina 2002; Oversloot, van Holsteyn and van den Berg 2002; Liubarev 2003; Hutcheson 2004; McAllister and White 2008. these six are in the Caucasus region. As in previous elections, ethnic regions dominate the high end of the distribution, with the top twelve spots (all giving United Russia over 80%) and 20 of the top 25 spots.
The mean for the ethnic regions is 76% and 61% for the other regions (t-test = -7.1 [.00]).
For the election of Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008, the voting results and an adequate turnout level were both seen as important. The Moscow Times, for example, quoted a governor's view: "What's the best way to show the next president that you love him? In this election, the answer is to guarantee him a good turnout so that Medvedev becomes Russia's legitimate president in everyone's eyes" (Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009, 9) What are the key patterns in the regional distributions across the 10 federal elections? First, as came up repeatedly in the discussion above, ethnic regions are different. Consistently from 1995 on, and dramatically in the 2000s, these regions have been much more likely to provide the party of power and the in-power presidential candidate with unusually high levels of vote support and of turnout. Since early in the 1990s, observers have noted the greater ability of ethnic regions' leaders to establish organized political dominance in their region and, with that organization, to control electoral outcomes (see, e.g., Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 48; McFaul and Petrov 1997, 517; Afanas'ev 2000, 207-10; Stepan 2000) .
Using a complicated measure derived from voting results, Oreshkin (2001, 91) came to the same conclusion that we do by examining the raw voting results: "In its electoral culture, the Russian Federation consists of two unequally sized parts: the 'Russian Russia' and the 'Russia of nationalities'." Second, and related to the pattern of ethnic regions at the high end of the distributions, those regions that back the party of power or the in-power presidential candidate remain considerably consistent from 1995 on. To illustrate this, Table 1 shows the correlations between each pair of legislative and each pair of presidential elections. The regional pattern for Russia's Choice in 1993 is entirely uncorrelated with that for Our Home in 1995. That pattern grows increasingly negatively correlated with regional voting for parties of power from 1999 on. In other words, while Russia's Choice might have had a degree of backing from federal authorities at the time, its impact on regional voting was scant. The regional rankings for Yeltsin in 1991 are modestly correlated with those for him in the 1996 second round and entirely uncorrelated with those for subsequent presidential elections. Meanwhile, the 1995 distribution 
Regional Deference to the Kremlin
When competitive elections are relatively fairly conducted and reported, data on regional differences illuminate the political preferences of geographically clustered, groups of Russian citizens, whether it be voting for presidential candidates or for "democratic" parties versus "communist" or "nationalist" practice of encouraging an unknown to run who has the same or almost the same name as a viable challenger (Maksimov 1999; Minchenko 2001; Miroshnichenko 2003, 258-65; Stoliarov 2003, 216-222; Wilson 2005, 62; Smirnov 2008) . In a second category are the means by which executive officials control who votes and how. The common term for such levers is "administrative resources" (see, e.g. , Nikolaev 2000; Minchenko 2001; Stoliarov 2003, 216-22; Vorontsova and Zvonovskii 2003; Mikhailov 2004, 198-99; Zvonovskii 2004; Baker and Glasser 2005, 322; Wilson 2005, ch. 4; Golosov 2008b ). These resources range from pressuring employees of a firm dependent on government contracts (Hale 2007, 228-29) , to having a court strike a rival candidate or party off the ballot, to using state officials to get out the vote, to thuggery against a rival's supporters (Kirkow 1998, 116-17) . A third category consists of the cases when the results are falsified through any of numerous means (Lowenhardt 1997; Paramonov and Kirichenko 2007; Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin 2009 ).
These problems vary by region. Indeed, the regional level seems to be the key locus for how campaigns will play out and how the elections will be managed. Beryozkin, Myagkov, & Ordeshook (2003, 170 ) put it this way:
As the sole focal point of political power within their domain, it is only reasonable to suppose that a governor is uniquely positioned to coordinate political activity there-the endorsements of newspaper editors, the actions of industrial managers, the efforts of directors of collective farms, and so on.
As Figure Our strategy, therefore, is to deploy the regional results of federal elections as indicators of one kind of strength on the part of a region's leadership: the ability to deliver turnout levels and vote totals for a particular party or candidate that exceed what could occur without elites pressuring voters or falsifying results. We take it as likely that such strength is organizational strength--that cadres of state employees and other supporters of the leadership have been formed into one or another sort of political "machine" to bring the reported results about. A machine need not be at work, however; authoritarian control can take other forms. The literature on political machines (e.g., Key 1936; Banfield and Wilson 1963; Scott 1972; Cornelius 1977 ) stresses that they flow from elites' inability to be fully certain of electoral outcomes. If, however, the leadership in a given region is essentially able to write down whatever results it wishes, little personnel power is required. The official results themselves shed no light on how much machine effort went into producing them. Nor do they reveal the presence or extent of other key aspects of machine politics such as elites providing patronage to those who support them.
under Putin but at least with the 1995 elections. Based on his fieldwork in Dagestan at the time of the 2003 Duma elections, Ware (2005, 590 ) notes a logic that can surely be found in many regions:
While the Duma elections in Dagestan's three single-mandate districts were relatively fair and free of irregularities, the results from the party list election are not credible, and appear to have been manipulated in two different ways. First, it appears that there was massive ballot stuffing in most or all districts, and second, that there was widespread tampering with electoral protocols. Together these manipulations appear to have achieved three tactical and three strategic political objectives. From a tactical standpoint, it appears that the irregularity of the party list election (a) artificially inflated Dagestan's total voter turnout; (b) massively skewed the result in favour of United Russia, the party of power; and (c) also somewhat skewed the result in favour of the KPRF. The achievement of these three tactical objectives seems to have secured the following three strategic goals: (1) the election successfully seated all Dagestanis who could possibly have won a place in the Duma; (2) the election evidently provided Kremlin officials with a demonstration of the loyalties and abilities of Dagestani officials; (3) it may have left officials in Moscow indebted to officials in Dagestan, thereby facilitating subsequent federal support, particularly in the form of budgetary subsidies.
As discussed above, the 1999 Duma race complicates the general pattern because two parties of power were available, and many of the regions that most clearly delivered high vote totals did so for OVR, which did not assume executive power as Unity did. Nonetheless, those regional leaderships that This sharply differentiates regions and allows one to distinguish groups with various levels of political loyalty."
With this logic in mind, we use regional voting and turnout levels as a measure of the strength of regional political organizations. We refer to our measure as an indicator of "deference to federal executive authority" or "deference to the Kremlin" because we are capturing how regional organizations use their strength to produce election outcomes that are strongly politically valuable to the Kremlin.
Calculated for each election cycle, our measure is a logged, weighted sum of scores above a cutoff point for each cycle's vote for the party of power, vote for the president and turnout levels for the two races.
4
Regions scoring zero on our measure were below the cutoff point on all four components. That is, their pro-Kremlin voting and turnout did not reach "highly improbable" levels by Russian and comparative experience, and we do not seek to analyze the variation in the actual levels below the thresholds. Higher scores on our measure indicates component scores farther above the cutoff points. Appendix 3 provides detailed information on how we constructed the measure and its distribution in each cycle. To make clearer how the measure is distributed in each cycle, we group the scores into half-point intervals in All of the higher-scored groupings show increases in the number of regions falling into them from the first to the fourth cycle. As indicated by the boxed cells in Table 3 For convenience, the final two groupings combine all regions scoring above 1 and above 2 as a way to highlight the trend toward increasingly high scores. From the first to the fourth cycle, the proportion of the regions scoring below one falls from 84% to 21%. Only one region reaches the more extreme level of two or above in 1995/1996 but 21 do in 2007/2008. In both the first and second cycles, the average percent Russian in regions scoring more than two is low; all four regions are ethnic. As more non-ethnic regions join the ranks of those with high scores in the third and fourth cycle, the average percent Russian rises but remains below half, indicating the predominance in this grouping of ethnic 
Score
Note: "Up to" is short-hand for the range from the previously noted number to the next. For instance, "up to .5" means 0<X<=.5. "Up to 1" indicates .5<X<=1--it does not include scores of .5 or lower. Cells with boxes around them show the location of the median score for that cycle. Sources: See Appendix 3. Formally, turnout is not mandatory in Russia, and the legislative elections do not produce the government.
So, when turnout approximates levels found in countries with mandatory voting or with institutions associated with high turnout, some form of elite pressure is surely at work.
A growing number of scholars have employed electoral data from all the regions to measure such things as the presence or absence of democratic properties (Moraski and Reisinger 2003; Marsh 2004; Petrov 2004) , 5 the strength of regional clientelism (Hale 2007) or the regional political "machine"/-strength of administrative resources (Oreshkin 2001; Mikhailov 2004; Zvonovskii 2004; Oreshkin and Oreshkina 2007 reasons, including the presence of anarchy or instability. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, measures of regional machine strength or electoral noncompetitiveness are likely to correlate with measures of democratization but negatively, with the "worse" regions having higher scores. Table 4 presents bivariate correlations between three of Petrov and Titkov's measures and regional vote totals, as well as our measure of regional deference to the Kremlin in each cycle. The rating of the quality of elections is a component of the index of regional democracy. We present it separately because of its inherent relevance. Up to .5 
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Mari El
Urals Tiumen To begin explaining the different regions' change (mostly growth) in deference to the Kremlin from the mid-1990s to the late 2000s, we regress this change on measures of a few regional characteristics. These characteristics include aspects of the regional setting in 1995--so as to assess the impact of regional starting points on the trajectories--as well measures of social and economic change over the thirteen years covered from the first to the fourth electoral cycle. What we are presently unable to incorporate into this analysis are characteristics of the elites governing each region. Because we believe that our measure of deference to the Kremlin captures a key aspect of the governing politics of the regions, attributes of the regional elite will need to be examined as potential influences. In this paper, however, we begin by testing for the influence of regional location, demography and social and economic changes.
We measure the change from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008 in each region's deference to the Kremlin by calculating a linear estimate of that change--the slope of the line going through all four points (see Appendix 3 for details). Unlike the difference between the first and last cycles' scores or the percent change from the first to the last cycle, the linear estimates preserve information about where the region scored in the second and third cycles. The resulting measure ranges from -.02 to .30, with a mean of .13
and a standard deviation of .06.
Our independent variables begin with the measure of deference for the 1995/1996 cycle. Because our measure of deference has a mathematically possible upper bound (achieved if a region achieved 100% vote and turnout in both elections in a cycle), those regions that were at the upper end in the first cycle were constrained from increasing their scores in subsequent cycles to the same extent as the other regions.
Including this variable controls for this tendency. Removing it does not, though, alter the signs or relative magnitude of the other coefficients in the tables below.
Our model incorporates an index variable meant to capture a region's relative urbanization and the socioeconomic development that accompanies urban life. 7 As Matsuzato (2000, 155) argues, "International experience suggests that the electoral skills of the party of power work better in rural than urban areas." (See also: Clem and Craumer 1995; Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 48; Solnick 1998 .) Because we are working with relatively few cases, we must keep the number of independent variables in our model small. In this case and for the measure of economic change described below, creating an index variable from several related types of data is the best solution. The index of urbanization includes the proportion of the region's population living in urban areas, the region's population density, the proportion of the population that has any higher education, the number of museum-goers per 1,000 residents and the number of theater-goers per 1,000 residents (see Appendix 3).
The findings presented earlier make clear that the ethnic regions (republics, autonomous okrugs and the autonomous oblast') are distinctly different from the remaining regions in their levels of deference to the Kremlin. Many multivariate analyses incorporate a dummy variable to capture this important factor, as we have (Moraski and Reisinger 2003; . In these analyses, however, we will instead use the percent of ethnic Russians in each region's populace. This measure correlates strongly with the constitutional status of the regions 8 but is preferable as an interval-level measure.
7 O'Loughlin, Shin & Talbot (1996, 356) provide an excellent summary of the literature on socioeconomic cleavages a la Lipset. Factoring the individual-level features that are pointed to in this literature into our analyses of regions means we are checking whether regions with more of those types of people in them will have regional political outcomes of an expected type. This cannot be assumed a priori (see Agnew 1996 , and the critiques and his reply in the same issue; DeBardeleben and Galkin 1997; Clem 2006) . 8 We correlated the percent of Russians in the populace from the 2002 census with the dummy variable that assigns a 1 to the 32 ethnic regions and a 0 to the other regions. The correlation is -.82 (.000). The average proportion of ethnic Russians in the ethnic regions is 46.6% versus 89% in the other regions. The t-test of the difference in these means is 13.5 (.000). This relationship remains after the recent elimination of six autonomous okrugs.
We also incorporate a dummy variable for the federal district whose regions were shown above to have somewhat higher levels of deference on average than regions located elsewhere: the Southern Federal District, which contains the republics in the North Caucasus area. Doing so will help clarify the impact of the percent of Russians in the population independent of the influence of this cluster of geographically contiguous regions.
We incorporate three measures of change from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008 . In general, all three are meant to capture different facets of life becoming worse for the populace. One is the change from 1995 to 2004 (the last year for which we have data) in the level of registered crime. The second, the index of economic change, incorporates the price-deflated change in personal income and in gross regional product per capita. Poverty is widely seen as empirically associated with clientelism, which is key to building a political machine. Stokes (2007, 617) argues that "the very definition of clientelism points toward the poverty of the client." Kitschelt and Wilkerson (2007, 24) put it this way: "Affluent democracies and parties appealing to affluent citizens in a democracy tend to operate more through programmatic accountability, while parties in poor democracies and parties appealing to the poorest electoral segments tend to practice clientelism." The third is infant mortality, as with the change in deference calculated by taking the linear change from [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . High infant mortality, in addition to being regrettable on its own, is a marker of poor public health conditions more broadly. Table 6 presents the results. We show The control variable of where they were in the first cycle is strongly negative, meaning those who were high outliers then do not go up as much. (As noted, this is mathematically necessary.) Even though the ethnic regions predominate among those highly deferential in 1995 and thus their slope is partly controlled for, nonetheless percent Russian has a strong negative impact on the over-time slope, as it did for the cross-regional analyses. The bivariate correlation between percent Russian and the slope of change in deference is =.48 (.000), and the other variables in the model do not eliminate this connection.
As expected, those regions in the Southern and Volga districts have higher slopes on average than other regions. None of the change measures has more than a modest impact. Each of their coefficients, moreover, works in an unexpected direction.
Perhaps, given that the ethnic regions are distinct in their levels of deference, the explanations work differently for them versus non-ethnic regions. In Table 7 , we present the results of the same regression analysis on the two subgroups of cases: ethnic and non-ethnic regions. Within non-ethnic Table 7 further suggests that tracing out these connections may best be done by distinguishing the ethnic from the non-ethnic regions.
Conclusion
Shedding light on citizens' electoral values and behaviors through analysis of aggregate election data is not possible in today's Russia. Too much stands between voter preferences and the published
results. Yet our analyses show that electoral results by themselves can be a useful instrument for examining variation across the regions in elite political control, and this has been true since the mid-1990s. We have applied visual inspection and multivariate analysis to the regional voting in Russia's ten federal elections as well as to a measure of deference to the federal executive authority by regional elites, which we constructed from voting and turnout data. Our analyses of all the regions for all ten elections complement the many insightful analyses that either focus on a few of Russia's regions or generalize about "the regions" and "the center" without accounting for the variation in the former. That Russia's republics, in particular, along with its autonomous okrugs and oblast have been politically distinct from the other regions is not, to be sure, "new news." Nikolai Petrov (2004, 266 ) has cleverly paraphrased Tolstoy: "While democratic regions are democratic in different ways, undemocratic regions are undemocratic in much the same way," but this is inaccurate at least with respect to the ethnic versus the non-ethnic regions. This dichotomy should not be an endpoint for analysts, however. Many more insights about politics at the regional level as well as about federal relations are likely to emerge if this difference is treated as a starting point. Our analyses suggest some of the additional complexities worth pursuing. For one thing, the sharp difference between the ethnic and non-ethnic regions is not due to the former's special constitutional prerogatives--or not due to them in a simple fashion. Within the group of ethnic regions, there is significant variation in how they respond to changing political dyamics from the 1990s into the 2000s, and the ethnic composition of their populaces is a strong explanatory variable in modelling this variation. Also, given that the ethnic regions were more likely to demonstrate deference to the Kremlin in 1995 and 1996, it need not have been the case that they would be the regions with the highest average "trajectory" from the first to the fourth electoral cycle. Perhaps the experience of post-Soviet Russia's regions is showing that the ability to maintain a political machine or other form of authoritarian control is like wealth: higher initial stockpiles increase the rate of return.
As we noted earlier, some of the intriquing questions raised by our analyses may be answered by incorporating elite characteristics into our model of change over time. In addition, though, our findings suggest that the form of the models used should be carefully explored, since it may be the case not only that the ethnic and non-ethnic regions operate differently but that dissimilar dynamics drive their politics.
If relations between the federal authorities in Moscow and Russia's regions differ not just in the extent of the latter's deference but in what factors drive it up or down, then the future holds much more complexity in the governing of Russia than most analyses to date have indicated.
Appendix 1: Overview of Elections, Candidates and Key Parties, 1991-2008
Russia's formally competitive federation-wide elections span 1991 to 2008. The 1991 presidential election occurred while the USSR continued to exist, but it bears inclusion with post-Soviet Russian elections because it was decoupled from Soviet-era election processes, and the result--the election of Boris Yeltsin as president--was maintained when Russia became an independent country at the end of 1991. Subsequently, federal legislative elections were held in 1993, 1995, 1999, 2003 Before analyzing the regional distributions of results from these elections, we will summarize the context in which each election occurred. Those familiar with Russian federal elections of the 1990s and 2000s may skip down to Table 1 on p. 32, which summarizes the elections, candidates and parties we will discuss thereafter. Yeltsin had been head of the Russian legislature since April 1990. In early 1991, in response to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev creating a presidency for the Soviet Union, Yeltsin convinced the Russian legislators to enact changes to the Russian Republic's constitution creating the post of president, with elections to the post to be held every four years. 9 Election requires a candidate to receive over 50% of the votes, either initially or through a run-off between the top two vote-getters in the first round. The first elections occurred in June of that year (for more on this election, see White, Rose and McAllister 1996, 35-40; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 27) . Six candidates were on the ballot.
Yeltsin's primary challenger was Nikolai Ryzhkov, a former Soviet prime minister. Yeltsin received a majority on the first ballot.
The December 1993 elections took place two months after a bloody showdown between Yeltsin and his opponents in the then-existing legislature. 10 Following his victory, Yeltsin issued a draft constitution that created a bicameral legislature and a presidency with much greater constitutional power than 9 In 2008, the constitution was amended, inter alia, to lengthen the presidential term from four years to six years. The changes do not apply to those currently in office. The next presidential election, therefore, is scheduled for 2012, but the subsequent one will occur in 2018. 10 The 1993 crisis between President Yeltsin and the parliament emerged as the two sides disagreed on the direction of economic reform, the division of powers between the federal executive and legislature as well as different drafts of a new Russian constitution. The confrontation reached its climax in September when Yeltsin disbanded the Russian parliament, stripped all of its deputies of their legal mandates, and set new federal parliamentary elections for December. The resulting standoff ended in early October when violence broke out in Moscow and Yeltsin convinced the military to storm the parliament building and arrest those inside. See, inter alia, Kutsylo 1993; Buzgalin and Kolganov 1994; McDonnell 1994; Zheleznova, Panova and Surkov 1994; Shevtsova 1996; Remnick 1997, 37-83. before. The bicameral legislature's lower house is the State Duma (or, simply the Duma). Duma members were to be chosen in two ways. Half, or 225 seats, were assigned according to single-member- several communist-oriented parties that were created in the following months, and it became the primary anti-establishment political party in the Russian party structure (for more on the CPRF, see Sakwa 1996; Tsipko 1996; Urban and Solovei 1997; March 2002) . Although officially unaffiliated with President Yeltsin, the party known as Russia's Choice was headed by several top aides who had led the reforms in 1992 and 1993, and it saw itself as a party representing loyalty to Yeltsin (for more on Russia's Choice, see McFaul 1998; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 31-33) . Even though some scholars exclude Russia's
Choice from their list of the parties of power (e.g., Turovskii 2002, 920) , it did enjoy tacit support from the President in the form of more access to state resources than its rivals (Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Golosov 2004, 30; White 2007, 25 1995/1996 and three months ahead in 1999/2000, 2003/2004 and 2007/2008. 13 These legislative and presidential pairs form four electoral cycles, therefore, and we treat them as such.
Of the 43 total parties appearing on ballot for the December 1995 Duma elections, three of the four that passed the 5% threshold had run in 1993: the CPRF, the Liberal Democratic Party and Yabloko.
The fourth, Our Home is Russia, was created earlier that year with the approval of President Yeltsin and headed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Compared to Russia's Choice, it represented centrist and less economically radical policies. Like Russia's Choice two years earlier, Our Home had an advantage in access to state resources and the media due to Kremlin backing and was considered a party of power (Badovskii and Shutov 1997, 36; White, Wyman and Oates 1997, 771; Gel'man and Elizarov 1999, 34; Colton and McFaul 2000, 202; Easter 2001, 56; Remington 2008, 172-73) . The Communist Party received the highest proportion of the votes cast nationwide, over 22%, with an even higher percentage being cast for parties that fell below the threshold, almost 27%. Our Home placed third with 10%. (For more on this election's run-up and results, see White 1997.) 1996 brought tremendous interest in whether Yeltsin would be able to beat off a challenge in the June election from CPRF leader Gennadii Zyuganov given the CPRF's strong showing in the 1995 Duma election combined with Yeltsin's single-digit public-approval ratings at the start of the year (for a narrative account of this election, see Remnick 1997, 317-354) . Yeltsin was able, however, to rally support throughout the first half of 1996. Among many factors accounting for Yeltsin's resurgence was his success at framing the race as a referendum on a return to communism. 14 Yeltsin received a plurality of 35%, with Zyuganov second at 32%. Because no candidate exceeded 50% of the votes, a run-off election was held in June. Yeltsin made an alliance with the third-place finisher, General Alexander Lebed, who had received 14.5% in the first round. Yeltsin received 54% of the votes in the second round. Change in 12 The 2008 constitutional amendments lengthened the term of Duma members from four years to five, to apply to those next elected. Thus, upcoming legislative elections will occur in 2011 and 2016. As a result of the different lengths for presidential and legislative terms, legislative and presidential races will no longer form a cycle. The gap between them will vary from four months, as has been the case and will be again in 2011/2012, to over two years. 13 For an examination of the 1999 Duma elections as pseudo-primaries for the 2000 presidential race, see Shvetsova (2003) . Sakwa (2000) refers to the 1999/2000 cycle as "Russia's permanent (uninterrupted) elections." 14 For an argument that the 1996 presidential election ends a period in which "all of the binary votes" from 1990-1996 were driven by attitudes for or against "reform," broadly understood, see McFaul and Petrov (1997, esp. 509-11). regional totals between the first and second rounds provides evidence of regional machines throwing their support behind Yeltsin more strongly in the second round than in the first. Given our interest in regional deference to federal authority, we therefore present second-round results for 1996 below.
With Yeltsin constitutionally obligated to step down in 2000--and with his health too poor to push the issue--everyone understood that the 1999-2000 electoral cycle would determine his successor (on this cycle, see Colton and McFaul 2003; Hesli and Reisinger 2003) . Several regional governors sought to maximize their influence over the federal center in the years ahead--which included presidential ambitions on the part of some--by creating political parties to compete in the 1999 Duma elections. Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov created the Fatherland Movement in December 1998, and despite many regions' distrust of the capital city, gained the support of some 11 governors by the fall of 1999 (Lussier 2002, 59-64 Although the nationwide dominance of United Russia was unquestioned prior to the 2007 Duma race, federal and regional officials pushed hard to produce high turnout and high vote totals for this party of power (see White 2009 ). It proved easy to accomplish. Not only did Putin enjoy continued high popularity among the public, he had unified control of the federal organs and much stronger tools for influencing the regions than he had inherited. In addition, the public recognized and supported his party, United Russia, far more widely than other parties (Remington 2008, 169 March 2000 cycle. These scores are high enough to satisfy us that all four component variables measure a single concept.
We establish cut-off points based on results in the Russian experience and from other countries, one for each of the four types of component variable. We consider outcomes below these cutoff points to be equally unenlightening about regional elite control. For voting for the party of power, the cutoff point is 50%; for turnout in the legislative election, 70%; for voting for the in-power presidential candidate, 65%; and for turnout in the presidential race, 75%. Legislative elections consistently have lower turnouts than presidential races, and, in the 1990s, parties receive substantially lower vote totals than do competitive candidates in presidential races. We therefore set a lower threshold in legislative than in presidential races for assigning a non-zero deference value. Levels above any of these cutoff points are extremely rare among electoral democracies worldwide. In Russia prior to the 2003/04 cycle, these cutoffs are surpassed only by a few regions that were remarked on at the time as having had elite control exerted to shape the outcomes. Outcomes above each cutoff point do go towards the magnitude of the measure. Mathematically, we create these cutoff points by subtracting one from the cutoff point (which varies in the ways discussed above). That amount is then subtracted from the percentage of the vote for the case in question with all scores below one converted a score of one. We then take these transformed component scores and create a weighted sum for each electoral cycle. The sum is weighted in order to give more influence to the outcome of the voting for the president, since that outcome has had the highest stakes and drawn the most concern from the Kremlin. Finally, we take the natural log of each of these cycle scores. Doing so creates distributions that more closely approximate normality, which makes them more appropriate for the regression analyses we conduct. This transformation preserves the ordering of the regions and those that are the extreme outliers remain so. All the regions whose cycle scores were one now have scores of zero, indicating that they were below the designated cutoff points on all four components of that cycle's measure. Table A2 .1 provides distributional information on the measure of deference to the Kremlin in each cycle. The skewness statistic indicates the degree to which the distributions are strongly right-tailed. The lower limit of zero on the deference measure requires their distributions to be skewed to the right to some extent. A high distribution with high kurtosis has a sharper peak and longer, fatter tails, while a low kurtosis distribution has a more rounded peak and shorter thinner tails. Note: The number of cases is shown below the correlation in each cell.
Measuring Change in Deference to the Kremlin from 1995/1996 to 2007/2008 To capture the extent and direction of each region's change in deference across the four election cycles, we employ the slope of the line through its values for each of the four cycles. This is superior to calculating the percentage change between the first and final cycle because it incorporates information about the middle two electoral cycles. Negative scores indicate that the trend from the first to the fourth cycle was downward; positive scores indicate a trend for higher (more deferential) scores. The distribution of the resulting variable is included in Table 7 above. Note: The t-test assesses the hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean value for the given federal district and the mean value for all the remaining regions. Z-scores indicate by how many standard deviations each case is above or below the overall mean of .13.
